In Europe, food retailing has become more concentrated and private label goods have spread over the last 40 years. They are now a key element of retailers' shelf offer. Using a model in which consumers become informed about the good's quality only in period two, we examine what determines the presence or absence of private label experience goods in supermarkets, taking into account the retailer's reputation commitment involved. Our most novel result is that for products purchased infrequently, introducing a reputable private label is unsustainable. However, more retailer bargaining power increases the likelihood of a private label good being marketed.
Introduction
Two major features of the retailing industry evolution in Europe over the last 40 years are increased concentration and the spread of private label products. Successive mergers between distributors have led to concentrated retail markets. For example, in France, the five biggest retailers accounted for more than 65% of food retailing in 2004, and in the United Kingdom, the CR4 was estimated at 93% in 2003 . 1 In addition to this increase in concentration in the food retailing industry, distributors have successfully launched private labels (also named store brands or own brands). In the UK, the average market share of private label was about 41% in volume for 2002, whereas in France it was 24%.
2 One consequence of these dual trends in the food retailing industry is to increase retailers' bargaining power vis-à-vis the upstream sector.
However, looking more closely at the UK private label statistics, some products such as Beer, Lager & Cider (14%) or Baby Food (4.3%) show low penetration rates and even the largest chains do not offer them (e.g. neither Tesco nor Leclerc stock private label baby food). In explaining this low penetration, the lack of confidence in the product (or in the retailer's brand relative to the national brand) is relevant, as described in Shapiro (1993) .
This clearly suggests that the characteristics of the good are important for the retailer's decision on whether or not to introduce a private label. In the food sector, most goods can be considered to be experience goods: quality is only ascertained after consumption, unlike search goods where quality is known before purchase.
3 One specific feature of experience goods is given by Nelson (1970) : sampling the good destroys it (of particular relevance for food products). This aspect of food purchasing has not been taken into account by the classical economic analysis of private labels where the store brand is always considered to be a search good. 4 In articles such as Mills (1995) or Bomtems, Monier and Réquillart (1999) , private label quality serves to discriminate final consumers demand and to increase the competition between private label and branded products, enabling the retailer to get input price concessions. However, the experience good characteristic of the private label provides an additional strategy to the retailer when considering the introduction of a store brand. As pointed out 1 Competition Commission (2003), Table 5 .15, for stores of over 1400sq m, under the assumption that Morrisons takes over Safeway in its entirety (essentially what happened). 2 PLMA's 2002 International Private Label Yearbook, prepared by AC Nielsen. 3 Some of these goods may be credence goods where quality is never ascertained. Examples might include goods with health risks like meat for instance. Nevertheless, a credence good can be thought as an experience good where the lag between consumption and quality revelation tends to infinity. 4 For an economic survey of private label issues, see Bergès-Sennou, Bomtems and Réquillart (2004) .
by Shapiro (1982 and 1983) , with an experience good the retailer can cheat for some period(s) on the quality sold to consumers (by saving the costs of producing high quality), since they will only discover the true quality after some lag. The retailer therefore has an incentive to benefit from this information imperfection by milking the consumer in relation to the difference between expected quality and true quality sold. Put another way, there is the potential for a lack of trust on the part of the consumer relating to private label products. As a result, the private label must sell at a discount, making it a less attractive opportunity for the retailer.
The objective of this paper is to develop a modeling framework to provide predictions regarding whether and when a reputable private label will be produced, focusing on frequency of purchase and retailer bargaining power. In doing so, we provide a formal framework in which to assess results that have been considered likely and observed empirically. For example, DelVecchio (2001) finds empirically that private label quality is perceived as low when average interpurchase time is high. Sethuraman and Cole (1997) have an empirical result that the premium consumers are willing to pay for a national brand product over a private label product is lower when the good is frequently purchased. Empirically, it has also been found that the percentage of products which have a private label equivalent in supermarkets rises over time as supermarket power becomes concentrated (Clarke et al, 2002) .
We first find that for products with low purchase frequency (or products where the lag between consumption and quality revelation is high), a reputable private label is not sustainable. However, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the private label introduction decision and the private label production cost. In other words, a decrease in the cost of the own brand can increase the incentives for the retailer to milk as quality chosen becomes closer to that of the branded product, and thus lessens the foregone future discrimination profits from milking.
Second, introducing retailer bargaining power in the analysis, we find that an increase in the distributor's bargaining power can help it to sell a reputable private label. However, for infrequently purchased goods, or credence goods, whatever its bargaining power, a private label is never reputable enough for consumers because the incentives to milk are always higher than those necessary to maintain the store reputation.
This analysis casts some light on why reputation is an important characteristic in the economic analysis of private labels, and thus why branded products do so well in specific areas where brand name is really important for consumers (baby food, health and beauty, sodas), but not in other areas (meat, frozen food, biscuits, etc.).
In the next section, we describe the framework of the model (consumer demand, retailer's options) and solve the three possible equilibria. Section three derives the retailer's choice on the reputation issue. The fourth section incorporates retailer bargaining power into the private label reputation analysis. Section five concludes.
The framework
In order to analyze the reputation issue, we consider two goods sold by a retailer to consumers on the final market (the retailer is assumed to be in a monopoly position), one a branded product (national brand), the other a private label. Demand is vertically differentiated. We first describe the consumer's preferences, then the retailer's strategies. This section ends with the computation of the Nash equilibrium outcome.
Consumers' Demand
The retailer faces consumers differing in their willingness to pay for quality. The consumer's utility when she buys a unit of good of quality q at price p is of a classic Mussa-Rosen (1978) form:
( 1) where θ is the willingness to pay for quality. We assume that
When there is only one good, the consumer indifferent between consuming the good or not is characterized by 0
The retailer therefore faces demand:
In the case where consumers are offered two goods, one is assumed to be of high quality q (and sold at price p ) whereas the other is of lower quality q (sold at p ). The consumer indifferent between buying the high and low quality good is characterised by ( , ) ( , )
There also exists a consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good and nothing. She has
. Thus demand for the high quality good is defined by:
Similarly, demand for the low quality good is given by:
5 The willingness to pay parameter is uniformly distributed across [0, 1] . Therefore the market will never be fully covered, preserving an elastic demand.
.
At the equilibrium both goods are sold as long as ( , ) 1
. This gives two conditions on prices to be satisfied:
The Retailer's Options
The central goal of this paper is to analyse the retailer's incentive to introduce a new private label product where quality is chosen by the retailer. Since when considering experience goods dynamics matter, we use a two-period model in order to capture the fact that consumers discover the quality of the private label only after consumption. In other words, in the case where the private label is available, consumers may buy the private label in the first period. They then assess its quality, and decide whether or not to buy it again in period two. Specifically, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. The retailer decides whether to introduce the store brand or not and chooses once-for-all, quality q S (not yet observed by consumers) together with the price of the national brand (p B ), and if necessary, the price of the private label (p S ); 2. Consumers make their decision on which good to buy in the first period according to the expected private label quality. They then learn the true quality of private label and decide whether to buy again in the second period or not;
Prior to the introduction of the new good, the retailer is assumed to have been selling a well-established (national) brand for some time. So far as the national brand is concerned, its name, the advertising done by the producer and the fact it has been consumed for some while make its characteristics well known to consumers. The quality of the branded product is normalized to 1 B q = . In addition to this existing product, the retailer wishes (if profitable) to introduce its own brand product. However, because it is a new product, consumers will treat it as an experience good and will form prior beliefs on the quality chosen by the retailer. We give consumers' expectations a similar structure to Shapiro (1983) .
6 Consumers' beliefs are updated according to the
, where t R is the retailer's reputation at date t and 1 t q − is the quality observed by consumers in the previous period. In our two-period model, such a rule boils down to 2 1 R q = , quality expected in the second period is just that discovered after consumption in period 1. Moreover, this adjustment equation supposes that all consumers share information by communicating with each other. The quality of the private label is publicly disclosed in the second period of the model. 7 Note that consumers differ only in their willingness to pay for quality, not in their quality level assessment of the product once consumed. The adjustment equation reflects the fact that consumers do not observe private label quality prior to purchase. A direct consequence is that the retailer can milk, at least for the first period, by providing lower quality than that expected by consumers. This possible cheating strategy clearly results from the one period lag between observing quality and updating beliefs. In this paper, we look for the retailer's incentives to provide a reputable private label, that is to provide a store brand fulfilling consumers' expectations.
In order to simplify the model, we assume that the retailer decides the private label quality once and for all at the beginning of the first period. However, since prices are more flexible than quality (which involves significant investment), the retailer decides prices each period. Period t=1 denotes the introduction of the new good, and period t=2 encompasses the (infinite) remaining periods after private label quality has been observed by consumers. The retailer's total profit can therefore be written as Here, ∆ is the composite discount factor between period 1 and the remaining periods encompassed in period 2. 9 This composite discount factor is important in capturing the difference between products. Indeed, for some products, the lag between the first purchase and any re-purchase can be significant (for example, Health and Beauty, Hot beverages, Household) whereas certain other products are purchased more frequently (Dairy, Groceries). In our analysis, products with a 7 One justification, given in Allen (1984) , is that consumers share information through publications such as consumer reports in magazines, market surveys or word-of-mouth reputation. 8 In Shapiro (1983) , quality is potentially different in each period even if, at the equilibrium, quality level remains unchanged.
9 To be precise, the retailer profit should be given by low purchase frequency are characterized by a low ∆ , and vice versa. 10 The national brand and the private label are purchased equally frequently so there is no need to consider a differential discount factor between them.
The Three Possible Nash Equilibria
The technology faced by the national brand producer for the branded product leads to a unit cost of
Since we assumed q B =1, the branded product unit cost is ½. The private label manufacturer is assumed to face the same technology (a quadratic unit cost function in quality), but may or may not be at a disadvantage relative to the national brand producer, as in Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999) or in Caprice (2000) . Therefore, c > . We allow for a range of parameters for c which encompass both a disadvantage ( 1 c > ) and a slight advantage ( 8 9 1 c > > ). We assume that the manufacturer makes zero mark-up on the private label wholesale price. This is a classic assumption, found in Mills (1995) or in Bontems et al. (1999) coming from the idea that the private label is produced by a firm belonging to a competitive fringe. We also assume that the contract between the national brand manufacturer and the retailer is a two-part tariff. It is well known that in the absence of competition downstream, the result of a two-part tariff contract will be to set the wholesale price at marginal cost, so w B =½. For the moment, we suppose the retailer has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it or leave-it offer to the branded product manufacturer. The franchise fee thereby allows the distributor to capture the entire vertical surplus created from the national brand sale.
11
In our model, there are three alternative possible strategies for the retailer: (i) not to introduce a private label, instead selling only the national brand over the two periods, (ii) to introduce a private label that fulfils consumers' quality expectations, or (iii) to milk consumers by introducing a private label of low (null) quality, upsetting consumers' expectations but making them pay high price in the first period because of the 'purchase -quality revelation' lag.
Under the second and third alternatives, price in the second period could be different from the first. However, it turns out ex-post that this is not the case. For the second type of equilibrium (sustaining reputation), the price of the private label in the second period is equal to the price in the first period because of the 10 The period discount factor can be written as
where I is the market interest rate and T is the lag between periods. Therefore, as T increases δ decreases, and so does ∆ . Note that for credence goods, where quality is never ascertained, this translates into T → +∞ , implying 0 ∆ → .
11 For more explanation and results assuming a two-part tariff, see e.g. Tirole (1988) .
rational expectations assumption. As the private label quality sold on the market is that anticipated by consumers, and since neither quality changes over time, price does not change either. As in a steady-state, the second period is simply a repetition of the first one. Concerning the third type of equilibrium (milking on quality), the price of the private label in the second period is no longer an issue. Since consumers will be deceived in the first period by a null quality good, they will not buy again in the second period, whatever the price. Their willingness to pay for a zero quality good is indeed zero (see equation (1)). Note that the price of the national brand could be different in the second period since only that product will be bought by consumers. In our model this does not happen because of the Mussa-Rosen demand characteristics: removing the low quality good does not change the demand (the price) for the high quality good in a monopoly setting. The first Nash equilibrium consists in selling exclusively the national brand product to consumers in the two periods. Since we normalized the branded product quality to q B =1, the retailer chooses the price p B (the same in both periods) maximizing:
This leads to the following equilibrium price and profits: 
The second possible Nash equilibrium is for the retailer to sell the national brand product and to introduce its own private label good, incurring a fixed cost F.
12 In this paper, brand loyalty is not modeled explicitly. Although it is an important feature when considering the introduction of a new good, it can be taken into account in our framework in two ways. First, consumers do not view the national brand as an experience good. This means that the national brand is a well-established product and so its quality is known. Second, the fixed cost element is assumed to reflect the degree of difficulty the new product has in coping with the loyalty of the existing one. In other words, if the private label faces a very well established brand with loyal consumers, the cost in advertising and promotional campaigns should be higher. Therefore, in this framework, an increase in F can be interpreted as an increase in the brand's loyalty.
We assume that the national brand is of higher quality than the private label: q B >q S . 13 The retailer chooses the final prices for both products, but also the 12 Such a fixed cost could consist of in-store advertisement for the new product and a promotional campaign to announce the new product's availability. 13 This is a classic assumption made in the economic literature on private label as in Mills (1995) quality of its store brand. The program, after simplification to reflect the property that prices are invariant across periods, is thus:
The price solutions expressed in terms of private label quality are given by: 
This leads to an optimal private label quality of: 
Note that the conditions required in equation (5) are fulfilled as long as 8 / 9 c > .
The third possible Nash Equilibrium for the retailer is to milk by misrepresenting its store brand quality. Because consumers only observe quality after consumption, the one period lag gives room for the retailer to cheat concerning its store brand quality. By definition of an equilibrium fulfilling consumers' expectations, the quality consumers anticipate in the first period is * S q as stated in equation (10), sold at price * S p from equation (11). Therefore the retailer can produce a poor-quality store brand at very low cost and sell it at price p S * during the first period. During the second period, no consumers will buy the store brand again, but some of them will consume the national brand.
14 The or Bontems, Monier and Réquillart (1999) . It seems to fit quite well with the facts, since consumers tend to judge the private label product as weakly inferior to the national brand. See Rao and Monroe (1989) or Richardson, Dick and Jain (1994) for relevant consumers' blind tests. 14 It could have been assumed that consumers cheated on by the store brand retaliate against the retailer by not consuming its branded product again. Under such an assumption, these consumers' demand would vanish. However, assuming that cheated consumers do not just vanish but that some of them consume the national brand in the second period does not qualitatively change our results. 
retailer who cheats gains the first period private label discrimination revenues without incurring any cost. Thereafter, demand for the private label drops to zero resulting in a second period loss. Profit in this third equilibrium is given by the following expression in prices when consumers' expectations for prices and quality in period 1 are those stated in equation (10) and (11), and where the branded product price at period 2 is denoted B p :
Therefore, the optimal price for the national brand is 3 / 4 B p = leading to a profit, when milking, equal to:
( 1 4 )
The Retailer's Choice
The retailer's choice over the three possible subgame equilibria will rely on the three parameters of the model: c (cost advantage/disadvantage), F (consumers' loyalty) and ∆ (discount factor).
Proposition 1: The longer it takes to ascertain the quality of the product (the lower is ∆) or the more brand-loyal consumers are (the higher is F), the harder it is to introduce a reputable private label. Production cost at the same level as the national brand (i.e. c=1) is not a sufficient condition to ensure a reputable private label, nor introduction of a private label good.

Proof :
The retailer will prefer to sell the private label product and sustain its store brand reputation (by fulfilling consumers' expectations) rather than selling only the national brand product as long as: (4 9 ) (9 8 
As a result of continuity in profits and transitivity, comparing the trade-off between selling only the branded product and milking is unnecessary. Figure 1 depicts the optimal equilibrium for the retailer for its store brand introduction policy, illustrated using F=0.02.
One interesting trade-off for the retailer is that between maintaining the reputation of its private label and using its reputation to milk consumers. It calls for two comments. The first is that the more impatient the retailer (the less frequently the product is purchased), or the less easy it is for the consumer to verify quality, the less credible is the store brand. Intuitively, an impatient retailer cares more about present profits than future ones. Therefore, its trade-off places more weight on the gains from cheating (production costs saved) than on the future losses (foregone discrimination profits). The second comment, perhaps less intuitive, is that for a given discount factor, a decrease in c increases the incentive for the retailer to milk. The frontier ∆ is indeed decreasing in c. When c is lower, that is when the national brand product has a smaller cost advantage, store brand quality increases and thus the total production costs (½ c q S .D S ) are also high. Gains from milking therefore increase as the saving of potential production cost is higher. In addition, as quality of the own brand product becomes closer to that of the branded good, discrimination profits decrease. Consequently, the loss for the retailer by milking -resulting in the absence of the private label product in the second period -becomes less and less important.
Note that allowing the private label to have a slight cost advantage over the branded product (1 8 / 9 c > > ) does not qualitatively change the results. The effect of considering the store brand as an experience good and not as a search good makes a difference. Without it, zone (1) would not exist. Indeed, in this zone, the retailer cannot sustain its reputation for its store brand. Because consumers anticipate that milking is more profitable for the distributor than sustaining reputation, they do not buy the store brand. 15 The new product is not credible for consumers and the retailer only effectively sells the national brand. By contrast with zone (2) where the store brand is not introduced because the fixed cost is too high compared to the revenues generated by the new product (or consumers are too loyal to the branded product), zone (1) deters the private label introduction because of the experience dimension of the good.
We can reinterpret these results in the following way. First, the fixed cost F can represent the image handicap the store brand product needs to overcome in consumers' minds relative to the branded product. For products where advertising expenses (like TV campaigns) by national brand producers are low, a private label is more likely to be launched because consumers do not put as much emphasis on the brand name. However, a high frequency of purchase or a straightforward ascertainment of quality is still necessary to ensure that the retailer will fulfill consumers' quality expectations for the store brand. Moreover, a decrease in the unit cost of the private label good, which can reflect the availability of new technology for the retailer that was previously used exclusively by national brand 15 One could argue that after being cheated, not all consumers vanish but that some buy again. Consumers' retaliation could indeed be less severe, but this would only reinforce the retailers' incentives to cheat as foregone profits in period 2 would be less important in case of milking.
producers, favors the private label. The retailer can indeed maintain a higher store brand quality that may now match consumers' expectations, whilst such a strategy would not have been possible with the previous technology.
A decrease in the cost of private label goods is not sufficient to explain their introduction by retailers: because below a certain threshold, the store brand is not credible anymore. The next section takes into account the bargaining power parameter of the retailer for analyzing the determinants of store brand introduction.
Retailer Bargaining Power
In order to incorporate retailer bargaining power into the model in a straightforward manner, we assume that the national brand manufacturer is also the private label manufacturer.
16 Dobson (1998) , Dunne and Narasimahn (1999) or Galizzi, Venturini & Boccaletti (1997) give some examples where this is the case. One consequence of this assumption is that the retailer's bargaining power will be used to split profits from the national brand product and from the store brand product since the manufacturer is the same for both goods. Since the national brand manufacturer also produces the private label, there is no cost disadvantage for the store brand product. Hence, c=1, and the unit cost of the private label production is therefore ½ q S 2 . As it is well known, having a two-part tariff between the distributor and the producer means the wholesale price is set to unit cost (that is: w B =½ and w S =½ q S 2 ) and the ex-post profit is divided according to the retailer's bargaining power parameter α.
17 However, sensitive to reputation effects, the national brand manufacturer would not be keen to produce a very low quality store brand in order to assist the retailer's milking strategy. If the retailer decides to milk, we assume he therefore turns to an independent firm from the competitive fringe to produce the zero-quality store brand. In the milking equilibrium, parameter α thus only applies to the national brand revenues but not to the store brand ones. 16 Empirically, it is quite often the case that the branded manufacturer also produces store brand products. The two main arguments for making a good that will compete with the manufacturer's own products are: store brand production allows the manufacturer to use existing production capacity that would be costly if stopped; if the branded manufacturer refuses the retailer's offer to produce the store brand, another firm will do it, so better if he gets the money. Of course in some cases, the private label is made by a third party; we do not model this extension in order to avoid further complications. 17 The Nash-Bargaining framework, described in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , leads to a retailer's ex-post profit equal to α % of the vertical structure profits, whereas the manufacturer gets (1-α) % of it. The wholesale price maximizes the vertical structure profits (joint profits) whereas the franchise fee (not modelled here) allocates the surplus between the agents according to their bargaining power.
Proposition 2:
The greater is retailer bargaining power, the more likely is the introduction of a reputable private label.
Proof :
The ex-post profits in the three possible equilibria -equations (7), (12) and (14) -taking into account the bargaining framework with c=1, now become:
( 1 7 
respectively. The two frontiers ( ) α ∆ and ( ) α ∆ are rewritten:
The new situation is depicted in Figure 2 . An increase in bargaining power has two effects on the retailer's milking strategy. First, it obviously makes the introduction of the store brand more likely by giving the retailer more profit in order to cover the fixed cost F associated with the introduction of the new product. The second effect concerns reputation: when α increases, the ex-post foregone profits of discrimination if the retailer milks also increase. This lowers the incentives for the retailer to cheat on store brand quality by deceiving consumers' expectations.
It is also interesting to note that, even if the bargaining power increases, so long as the frequency of purchase of the product is quite low ( ( ) 1 ∆ ∆ < ), producing a high quality private label is not a credible strategy.
Recent retail industry mergers (for example in the UK-see Competition Commission, 2003) can be reinterpreted as an increase in the retailer's bargaining power vis-à-vis the manufacturer. In our model, this translates into a greater likelihood of the store brand being introduced because the benefits of reputation become more important.
Conclusion
The first general result of the paper is that considering the private label as an experience good has a significant impact on the outcome. Indeed, for products characterised by a low purchase frequency or difficulty in verifying quality, a private label is not credible and the retailer cannot maintain its reputation. In addition, decreasing the marginal cost disadvantage of the private label production is not always sufficient to ensure that the private label will be introduced.
Consideration of the retailer's bargaining power can jeopardise the decision to introduce a private label. When retailer bargaining power is high enough, it gives the distributor incentives to maintain its reputation (and fulfil consumers' expectations) by making the losses in case of milking too high. As previously stated, if the good is characterised by a low purchase frequency, significant bargaining power is not sufficient to ensure private label introduction. There is indeed a threshold under which a reputable brand is not viable, whatever the market condition.
These conclusions give some insight into why, for some products such as Hot Beverages or Health & Beauty (goods with low frequency of purchase compared to groceries), retailers' private label has a rather small market share (5% vs 24.4% on average). Of course, reputation is not the only factor in explaining the market share of the own-brand product because investment in brand and product image (advertising) is also important. In our model, we focussed exclusively on the reputation effect. This effect is not present if the private label is viewed as a search good because consumers have all the information and only look for the best 'quality/price' value.
In order to simplify the analysis, downstream competition was not modelled in this paper. In fact, introducing downstream competition gives consumers the opportunity to buy at another retailer's shop if they anticipate the retailer will milk. In the second period, the retailer will therefore earn zero profit rather than some profit due to the captive demand on the branded product. This implies that the presence of downstream competition will lessen the incentives retailers have to milk, but not remove them.
Collective reputation could also play a dissuasive role in milking on private label quality. Indeed, if the retailer milks on one particular private label product, due to the store name also appearing on all other products, consumers would not only retaliate by not buying the failing private label again but also by not buying other private label products. This possible collective retaliation, as pointed out by Andersson (2002) , may prevent the retailer from cheating because of the economies of scope in reputation.
